The abundance and diversity of threats to security and privacy over cellular networks is a well-established fact. Perpetrators may tap into various sources of data that are either stored on or communicated with any cellular device. For example, they may violate the privacy of cellular network subscribers by gaining access to stored files and private information, remotely operating the cellular device's camera and microphone, implanting malicious software, and even obtaining knowledge of their physical whereabouts.
Mobile phones as well as other portable devices that are employed for business use typically posses a wide variety of communication interfaces, each of which is vulnerable to cyber attacks. Examples for such interfaces are:                Voice calls;        Text messages;        Private emails and company emails;        Private apps, and company apps;        Access to company databases, business calendars and customer data; and        Any type of media including IP.        
Attackers may choose to hack data pertaining to a cellular subscriber through a variety of methods. Examples for such methods include:                International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catcher;        Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks;        Network attacks, e.g. by exploiting Signaling System 7 (SS7) loopholes; and        Different types of social engineering methods, for the purpose of information gathering, fraud, or gaining system access.        
Attackers may choose to interface the target User Cellular Device (UCD) through a variety of access points, e.g. through the cellular network, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or a USB connection.
Attackers may choose to target ‘ordinary’ cellular network interfacing devices (e.g. smartphones, tablets and laptop computers) as well as Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such as Machine to Machine (M2M) and connected cars.
Attackers may choose to target personal information stored on cellular devices (e.g. passwords), in order to ultimately target data that is stored elsewhere (e.g. email or drop-box accounts).
Prior art includes tools that provide some degree of security by monitoring the activity on the UCD from the end-users' perspective, such as various anti-malware software tools. Such tools are limited in their scope of response to threats:                They require installation of the security tool on the UCD, and rely on updates from external sources;        They do not relate to threats posed to the UCD from the cellular network's perspective; and        They do not control the interaction of cellular subscribers with the hosting network.        
Some network security solutions (e.g. US2016226913: “Technologies For Scalable Security Architecture Of Virtualized Network” and US20160308837: “Methods And Apparatus To Configure Virtual Private Mobile Networks For Security”) disclose methods for securing the functionality of modules of the cellular network, but do not directly address UCD data security and the privacy of cellular network subscribers.
The disclosed invention addresses the issue of cellular security in a comprehensive perspective, addressing threats of multiple categories and sources, from both the UCD's and the network's perspective.